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UNEXPLORED AVENUES IN COMPARATIVE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
ROBERT STEVENS* 
I assume Harry Lawson has always had the ability to stimulate. 
Certainly in the Oxford of the early 1950's, he stood almost alone. 
With the exception of linguistic philosophy and Roman law, the 
Honour School of Jurisprudence was committed to traditional legal 
scholarship. For those who cared about the common law and its 
institutions, and were anxious to see what lay "out there" in related 
disciplines, or even in what we naively believed to be the real world, 
the Lawson seminars at Brasenose became a "must." In different 
ways, through these seminars and his other teaching, Lawson must 
have inspired generations of undergraduates and graduates to be-
gin asking the difficult questions: to think in an informal way about 
the law in context, and, in a more formal sense, to explore the 
boundaries of law and history and law and social sciences. Insofar 
as I have found myself able to ask questions about these relation-
ships, I lmow I owe a great deal to the Professor of Comparative 
Law. 
It would be nice-in the legal sense-to say that Harry had 
turned me into a comparativist. I fear this is far from true; but 
he taught us all a great deal about what I would now call the 
English and American legal cultures. It was really he who first 
explained to me the subtleties of Anglo-American law and taught 
me to approach the common law of the two countries as a com-
parativist. For just as Bernard Shaw saw England and the United 
States as "two nations divided by a common language," Harry saw 
the dangers of "two nations divided by a common legal system." 
In the last twenty years, of course, much has changed. Nobody 
-with the possible exception of the officers of the American Bar 
Association and editors of the Law Quarte1·ly Review-now believes 
that, because some substantive rules are couched in similar terms 
in the United States and England, the two legal systems are thereby 
made the same. The legal cultures of the two nations are probably 
still growing apart and the role of law in the two societies may, 
indeed, be moving in different directions. Thus, although American 
authors understandably-trace American substantive doctrines from 
their English sources, and English authors seek to illuminate tort 
or contract from the latest American judicial decisions or legisla-
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University of Oxford; LL.M. 1958, Yale University. Barrister at Law. 
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tive solutions, this cross-referencing is no longer in the mainstream 
of legal development. 
At a broader intellectual level, comparative contextual analysis 
of doctrine is highly significant: whether Jim Gower's work on 
comparative law1 or Mauro Cappelletti's study of executive privi-
lege.2 However, much remains to be done. There is still, for in-
stance, no serious comparative Anglo-American work on civil 
liberties, nor, despite Kenneth Culp Davis' exhortations,3 in admin-
istrative law; and comparative Anglo-American analysis in labor 
law is only now under way. 
Nevertheless, in view of the limits on the value of doctrinal 
comparisons, the more important future developments in compara-
tive studies probably lie in the comparison of legal institutions. 
Already Delmer Karlen has undertaken preliminary studies of the 
appellate4 and criminal5 process in the two countries. Other studies 
are about to take off: The Yale Economics Department is consider-
ing a study of the use of judicial time in England and the United 
States; the Institute of Comparative Law in Florence is to under-
take a study (including both England and the United States) of 
access by the poor to the courts. And comparative criminology 
promises to stimulate increasing interest in the next few years as 
the most effective method of evaluating criminological develop-
ments. 
So, too, comparative studies of the professions and their train-
ing are expected to be productive in the coming years. In view of the 
criticism of the divided profession in England, 6 and the suggestion 
by Chief Justice Burger that something along the same lines be 
reinvented in this country, 7 the need for a serious comparative 
study is obvious, for example, to illuminate the relative economics 
of litigation, to mention but one aspect of the overall problem. To 
those of us in legal education, there is the fascinating prospect of 
a socio-psychological study of the relationship between professional 
attitudes-both ethical and intellectual-and legal training. The 
various relationships in England between professional apprentice-
1 Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1956). 
2 Cappelletti & Golden, Crown Privilege and E.zec:utive Privilege: A British 
Response to an American Controversy, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 836 (1973). 
3 Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England, 61 Colum. L. 
Rev. 201 (1961). 
4 D. Karlen, Appellate Courts in the United States and England (1963). 
5 D. Karlen, Anglo-American Criminal Justice (1967). 
6 M. Zander, Lawyers and the Public Interest (1968). 
7 See Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training 
and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 227, 238-41 (1973). 
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ship, the didactic analytic form of much of institutionalised legal 
training, the role of law, and the behaviour patterns of the profes-
sion are both superficially apparent and neatly contrasting 
when compared with parallel patterns in the United States: the 
absence of formal app1·enticeship, the methodological or process 
oriented system of institutionalized education, and, in turn, what 
are thought of as characteristic sets of professional and judicial 
attitudes. 8 Yet the descriptions of such relationships are, in both 
countries, based on assertions rather than on research. 
The prospect of massive sociological comparisons may seem a 
trifle awe-inspiring, not to mention expensive in time and money. 
But a series of lesser Anglo-American comparative studies are 
much more readily available, as well as being, logically, a preface 
to wider undertakings. In particular, historical studies on a com-
parative basis are essential if we are to develop intelligent hypothe-
ses to be tested quantitatively. At the very least, we must first 
sharpen our understanding of how far the two legal systems are, 
in the words of Erwin Griswold, "Two Branches of the Same 
Stream."9 I would argue, as we begin to peer into the past, that in 
some ways the parallels between the two systems will seem closer 
and in other ways, further apart.10 Yet, in every respect, the com-
parative efforts handsomely repay any effort put into them in terms 
of understanding the peculiar nature of legal institutions and the 
legal process-and the myths which have been woven around legal 
traditions. 
I should like to illustrate the potential of historical reappraisals 
by superficial glances at two comparative episodes. Both, as I will 
argue for the purposes of stimulating more specific debate, mis-
understand, misuse or ignore the English element. (I would like to 
reserve the right to re-argue the positions at greater length, on the 
basis of further research at some later time. At this point, I am 
only anxious to show that the assumed bases of comparison are in 
need of further refining.) 
The Early Settlers: "We hate Lawyers more than you hate Lawyers" 
Let me begin with the earliest possible Anglo-American com-
parisons as an illustration that American scholars have tended to 
ignore English law and politics. Over the years, controversy has 
8 The relationship achieves some mention in L. J a:ffe, English and American 
Judges as Lawmakers 104-13 (1969}. 
9 E. Griswold, Two Branches of the Same Stream (1962). 
10 One of the problems in developing these comparative historical examples 
in law is the absence of good comparative Anglo-American history in other 
fields. A notable and elegant exception is H. Pelting, American and the 
British Left (1956}. 
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swirled around what the early settlers, in New England in particu-
lar, intended to be the basis of their laws. Pound11 and Morris12 
argued that the early settlers knew little of the common law and 
instead sought to develop a dispute settlement system based on the 
word of God; GoebeJ13 emphasized the importance of English local 
law in shaping colonial law, a view partially shared by Haskins ;14 
others have seen the colonial law as a largely indigenous develop-
ment responding to the physical conditions of the settlers; mean-
while, the courts, both English and American, have taken the legal 
position that the colonists were governed by the common law from 
the moment of their arrival. 
Fortunately, one need not enter into these battles here. Since 
Chafee's study,15 it is generally accepted that all four influences 
were at work, with the common law gaining the upper hand after 
1660. Nor is my point here merely to say that much of the earlier 
academic dispute could have been avoided by looking at the admin-
istration of justice outside London-where many of these same 
competing influences and systems were at work in the first half 
of the seventeenth century-rather than by looking primarily at 
the work of London's royal courts. (It is true, however, that until 
we have good studies of the English legal system outside London 
we shall always have problems of distortion in interpreting Ameri-
can legal history.) My basic point, however, is primarily concerned 
with the political interpretation by American legal historians of 
the early seventeenth century. 
While many of the early settlers in New England had had some 
kind of legal training, there was a strong anti-lawyer rhetoric16 
which may have confused historians of the American legal scene. 
I use the word confused because many American legal historians 
seem largely unaware of the strong anti-lawyer sentiment in En-
gland during the Eleven Years Personal Rule and the succeeding 
English Revolution. Yet, the hostility to lawyers and the common 
law, real and strong in England, was carried over to the colonies; 
moreover, when that hostility largely subsided in England after 
the Restoration, it also largely subsided in the colonies-including 
11 R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (1938). 
12 R. Morris, Studies in the History of American Law 17-41 (1959). 
13 Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New 
England, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 416 (1931). 
14 G. Haskins, Law and Authority in Colonial Massachusetts 105, 123, 
163-75 (1960). 
15 Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, 68 Proceedings Mass. 
Hist. Soc'y 132 (1952), 'l'eprinted in Essays in the History of Early American 
Law 3 (D. Flaherty ed.1969) [hereinafter cited as Flaherty]. 
16 1 A. Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America 55-94 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as Chroust]. 
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New England. Indeed, looked at in the context of what happened 
in England, the developments in Massachusetts, for instance, seem 
far less a break with the past than is traditionally assumed. 
The New England colonies were heavily influenced by the forces 
shaping England in the 1630's and 1640's. There may have been 
relatively few Levellers and Diggers in the colonies, but many, 
especially in New England, would have sympathised with the radi-
cals in the Barebones Parliament, while the Hale Commission 
might well have been regarded as a conservative body. In Massa-
chusetts, the puritan clergy were clearly the most powerful force; 
the demand for the integration of the laws of God and man in a 
Code was strong.17 The code produced by Nathaniel Ward, and 
enacted as the Body of Liberties in 1641, did justify certain provi-
sions, especially those relating to capital punishment, with biblical 
authority. Yet, this document, later adopted by Connecticut, bore 
many of the marks of the common law, both in substance and pro-
cedure. Nor was this surprising, for Ward had been a member of 
Lincoln's Inn before becoming a minister.18 And when, in 1647, the 
time came to revise the code, the General Court ordered the impor-
tation of various law books, including Coke, "to the end we may 
have the better light for making and proceeding about laws." The 
Book of General Laws and Liberties of 1648 was the result.19 
These influences were reflected in the early history of the pro-
fession. During the period under discussion there were no full-time 
lawyers, mainly because the economy could not support them. But, 
as already noted, a surprising number of the colonists had had some 
legal training; and increasingly, the part-time legal practitioner 
was making his appearance. Even a primitive society had to have 
its "law-jobs" performed; as its arms of government became func-
tionally differentiated, it could even afford full-time lawyers. 
The first Governor of Massachusetts had been admitted to the 
Inner Temple and some half-dozen more early colonists had some 
17 In 1636, John Cotton produced his systematic "Moses, his Judicialls"-an 
attempt to develop a code of law based solely on biblical sources. While, in that 
year, the General Court went so far as to urge magistrates to decide causes 
"as neere the law of God [or of Moses] as they can," John Cotton's efforts 
never reached the statute book in Massachusetts although they were influential 
in the dour New Haven colony. 
18 And the Puritan mind could take a neat legal distinction. In 1645 the 
General Court convinced itself that the laws specifically invoking the laws of 
God could not be contrary to English law since the common law was itself 
based on the laws of God. 1 Warren, History of the Harvard Law School and 
of Early Legal Conditions in America 11 (1908). 
19 Chroust, supra note 16, at 59-61. See also Wolford, The Laws and 
Liberties of 1648, 28 Boston U.L. Rev. 426 (1948), -reprinted in Flaherty, supra 
note 15, at 147. 
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legal training at one of the Inns. But at least two persons who had 
some training in the demi-monde of the Inns of Chancery made an 
attempt to practice as attorneys during these early years. Thomas 
Morton20 appeared in the early 1620's and managed to be deported 
twice, his chief "crimes" being heavy drinking, obscene verse, 
cavorting with Indians, and, perhaps worst of all, setting up a 
maypole! Thomas Lechford, from Clements' Inn, appeared in 1638 
and attempted to work as a scrivener. But when he began to prac-
tice law, his ethics appeared somewhat suspect. He was found both 
lobbying juries out of court and actually tampering with them. 
His hostility to puritanism did not help. He went home in 1641, 
the year the Body of Liberties forbad the practice of paying persons 
to appear on the behalf of others in court. 
At first glance, such developments seem to confirm the feeling 
that early colonists were outstandingly hostile to lawyers. But that 
assumption would put too much faith in the political rhetoric of 
New England, while ignoring both the rhetoric and reality of the 
contemporary scene in England. Although, during the early part 
of the seventeenth century, the demands for legal reform in England 
had mostly been limited to demands for changes in imprisonment 
for debt and to attacks on the work of the ecclesiastical courts, 
both Coke and Bacon had achieved some reforms. And pressure 
mounted throughout the 'twenties and 'thirties. After the battle of 
Naseby in 1645, the tone changed. From the work of Veall, we now 
know that hostility towards the common law reached a peak not 
seen since the Peasants Revolt.21 
Three months after Naseby, Lilburne wrote: "[t]he reforma-
tion of the courts of justice is a work of absolute necessity; without 
which ... you shall have no peace. But if you have many lawyers 
they will never suffer any effectual law to pass for this purpose, 
because they get more by the corruption and delays of the law 
than by the law itself."22 And the following year, Lilburne was in 
print again, arguing that the common law was a badge of slavery 
imposed by the Normans on the alien English and deliberately 
maintained through its use of foreign languages.23 By this time the 
2o But Ward, the author of the Body of Liberties, in that very same year 
found himself in a sermon urging Magistrates not to give legal advice to 
litigants before a case came on. The Laws and Liberties of 1648 dropped the 
prohibition on the practice of advocacy for gain; and in 1649 magistrates were 
forbidden to give legal advice to those appearing before them. The role of 
the attorney was recognized by statute in 1673 and at least part-time "lawyers" 
had arrived. Chroust, supra note 16, at 71-79. 
21 D. Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640-1660 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as Veall]. 
22 Id. at 74. 
23 Id. at75. 
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radicals were sufficiently organized to lobby Parliament for law 
reform. In 1647, Wildman, a Leveller lawyer, was demanding that 
the laws "be reduced to a smaller number, to be comprised in one 
volume in the English tongue, that every free commoner might 
understand his own proceedings, that courts might be in the re-
spective counties or hundreds, that proceedings might become short 
and speedy and that the numberless grievances in the law and 
lawyers might be redressed as soon as possible."24 The cry was 
soon taken up by the Diggers ;25 and it was perhaps fortunate for 
the lawyers that in 1648 the Army took over effective control. In 
1649 the king was executed. His problems, at least, were over; the 
same could not be said for the lawyers. 
While the army had little time for the Levellers-the lawyers 
had the pleasure of seeing Lilbume imprisoned-the Rump Parlia-
ment was determined to deal with the law and lawyers. In 1652, 
the Hale Commission was established and, although dominated by 
lawyers, was a reformist body.26 It ultimately produced a "System 
of Law" in sixteen bills that called for the regulation of the legal 
profession, the devolution of justice, simplification of legal proce-
dures, and considerable codification. But implementation of the 
new legislation was slow, because, according to Ludlow, of sabotage 
by the lawyers. Cromwell, dissolving Parliament in 1653, echoed 
the same complaint.27 
The Barebones Parliament met later in the year and was a very 
different creature. Although forty of its members had been educated 
at the Inns of Court, it set to work with a will to reform the law 
and, in particular, to implement the work of the Hale Commission. 
Motions were passed in favor of abolishing Chancery and codifying 
the law to make it "easy, plain and sb:'ort" and more in line with 
"the word of God and right reason.''28 And the work of codification 
actually began. In December, however, the conservatives, in a subtle 
parliamentary coup, succeeded in dissolving the Barebones Parlia-
ment. In the Temple the development was greeted with ''great joy 
in making bonfires and drinking sack."29 Since Cromwell shortly 
thereafter made himself Protector, and since he was, in many re-
spects, concerned to halt the social effects of the political revolution, 
the new Parliament had a strict property qualification. Cromwell 
still talked of the need for law refo1-m, but nothing was in fact 
24 I d. at 77. 
25 I d. at 78. 
26 See Cottrell, Interregnum Law Reform; The Hale Commission of 1652, 
33 Eng. Hist. Rev. 689, 696-97 (1968). 
27 Veall, supra note 21, at 85. 
28 Id. at 87-88. 
29 Id. at 88. 
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accomplished. With Cromwell's death in 1658, law reform was 
again an active issue, but the following year Monck's army marched 
on London. The Revolution was over. The efforts to simplify and 
codify the law, to make it conform more closely to God's word, and, 
as far as possible, to manage without lawyers, ended. 
With such b1·oad strokes, it is difficult to do more than create an 
impression of the interaction-or at least parallel nature-of law 
and politics in England and New England in the early seventeenth 
century. Still, I hope these superficial strokes are enough to suggest 
that, in general, the literature has examined the colonies too much 
in isolation. The religious and social movements that swayed Boston 
were strong in London, and the anti-lawyer movement was by no 
means unique to the colonies. In this regard, to ignore the English 
scene is to run a real danger of distorting the American. 
The New Nation: "Our Judges Are Better Than Your Judges" 
Let me now pass to an area where I think there has been some-
thing of a misunderstanding and misuse of the English parallel. 
I am sure it is far from deliberate; again, however, the situation 
is one that helps to distort any sophisticated analysis of the devel-
opment of the American legal culture. I refer to the Federal and 
early Jacksonian period and, in particular, to that new sport in his-
torical research-the discovery of the Americanization of the 
American legal system. I am not questioning that some American-
ization took place; indeed, the initial premise of this paper was to 
treat the English and American legal systems as separate entities. 
What does concern me is the casualness (and frequently the inac-
curacy) with which pa1·allels are drawn and, in particular, the 
casualness of the references to the role of the judiciary in England. 
A number of generalizations during the period concern the 
symbiotic relationship between English and American law and 
English and American lawyers. This symbiosis takes various forms. 
First, there was the relatively low-level problem of providing an 
American legitimacy or grundnorm for the basis of substantive law 
in the new nation.30 Second, there was a need, during the Federal 
ao That the common law was derived from England could not be denied, 
any more than the fact that most of the ancestors of the inhabitants of the 
new United States came from England. Thus, in many of the state Constitutions 
emerging during the period of the Revolution, there were reception clauses. 
There was little effort to challenge such receptions, but the problem was what 
to do with English decisions decided after the legal ties with London had been 
severed. Lawyers, whose generally accepted method of reasoning at this time, 
treated leading decisions, no matter how creative superficially, as being no 
more than declaratory of pre-existing doctrines, could see little wrong in 
continuing to cite the post-1783 decisions of Westminister Hall; besides, the 
English had a surfeit of published law reports; the new States virtually none. 
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period, to provide a model for the American judiciary. Third, there 
was the need during these years of finding the appxopriate process 
or role for the courts in the newly created society. In one sense, all 
were aspects of the need to "modernize," as those studying devel-
opmental economics would put it. To see these problems solely 
as issues of the American versus the English solution is, itself, 
deceptive. But they must be examined, no matter how briefly, be-
cause they are perceived by most scholars as an American solution 
to an English problem, and, therefore, inevitably concern us here. 
More complex than the reception of substantive law is the alleged 
Americanization of the Judiciary, particularly of the appeal judges. 
Writers concerned with this point, however, encounter basic prob-
lems, both with the idea of what the English system was and what 
the American goal was. Thus the English concept of the role of 
law is assumed to be a highly formalistic, technical, and static one, 
with Lord Mansfield as an exception. The American judge is some-
how assumed to be a natmal Mansfield-creative, using precedents 
as mere stepping stones. This somewhat schizophrenic approach 
overlooks the fact that the worst insult Jefferson could muster to 
describe the Tory Blackstone was that he was a Mansfieldian. 
In other words, what later writers have often overlooked is that 
the Jeffersonians and many others, if not the Federalists, were 
opposed to a creative judiciary.31 
Other problems remain. At the time of the American revolution, 
no specialized appellate judiciary existed in England ;32 hence, the 
idea that the newly created appeal courts in America were breaking 
with the English model is dangerously misleading. On the common 
law side, the Court of Exchequer Chamber, which was the first-level 
appeal court, was composed of the trial judges of the common law 
courts other than the one from which the appeal was taken. A 
second appeal in common law matters lay from Exchequer Chamber 
to the House of Lords where it was heard by a gxoup of peers that 
frequently still included laymen. For this reason possibly, it was 
But politicians were less willing to accept the sophistry which seemed reason-
able to lawyers. Both the New Jersey (1799) and Kentucky (1807) legislatures 
prohibited the citation of English decisions: but within a few years this 
intellectual chauvinism had passed. New Jersey repealed its legislation in 1819. 
See generally L. Friedman, A History of American Law 96-98 (1973). 
31 On the English scene, too, there were violent objections to the Mansfield 
view of the creativity of the judiciary. See, e.g., the letters of Junius. Junius, 
Letters et al. 179-81 (1836). 
32 Horwitz's work, while fascinating, fails to resolve the inconsistency in 
the American model of the judiciary and compares the American developments 
during the Federalist period with a stylized, and almost certainly inaccurate, 
version of the English model. See Horwitz, The Eme?·gence of the Instrumental 
Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, 5 Perspectives in Am. Hist. 287 
(1971). 
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not until well into the nineteenth century that more than one or 
two appeals annually in common law cases were taken to the Lords. 
On the Equity side, appeals were somewhat more frequent, but 
they were noted more for the fact that the only equity judge, the 
Lord Chancellor, was not only the trial judge but presided over the 
only appeal-to the House of Lords. Since there were, de facto, 
no appeals in criminal cases, it is not easy to say what in 1777 or 
1783 was the attitude of the English judiciary to the appellate 
process. Moreover, it was not until the second half of the eighteenth 
century that courts, of common law or equity, in first instance or 
on appeal, were seriously concerned with matters other than those 
relating to land, where the primary judicial policy was understand-
ably one of maintaining the status quo. 
Thus, at the time of the American Revolution, there were appeal 
courts in England, though no appeal judges; but these courts had 
little work that might bare whatever their views were of the judi-
cial process. This situation began to change with the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution, which roughly coincided with the Ameri-
can Revolution. Thus, while it is difficult to say what the English 
judges perceived the judicial role to be, whatever their attitude was, 
one can argue that it was changing as rapidly as the attitude of the 
new American judiciary. Mansfield was followed by Ellenborough, 
Alderson, and Abinger in the period between 1783 and 1840; and, 
whereas in 1750 the English legal system had been a highly formal-
ized system, concerned almost exclusively with land problems, in 
the period after the American Revolution, it entered a highly cre-
ative phase. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the 
judiciary created the rules on wrongful death, established the bases 
of restitution, vicarious liability, the fellow servant rule, as well as 
many of the basic principles of contract. The English judiciary was 
thus as "Americanized" as the American. After the Reform Act of 
1832, with redistribution of seats and a generally more democratic 
f1·anchise, there was a greater application of stare decisis as judi-
cial policy ;38 but the same trend may well have been true of Amer-
ican judges.34 
33 See B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts 18-19, 46-47 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Abel-Smith & Stevens]. 
34 Friedman interprets the impact of the Impeachment of Chase (1805) 
in this way: 
The judges won independence, but at a price. Their openly political role 
was reduced; and ultimately, most states turned to the elective principle. 
There would be no more impeachments, but also no more Chases. What 
carried the day, in a sense, was the John Marshall solution. The judges 
would take refuge in political decorum. The essence of their job would 
always be to make and interpret policy; but policy would be· divorced 
from overt, partisan politics. Principles and politics would flow, at least 
ostensibly, from the logic of the law; they would not follow the naked 
give and take of the courthouse square. Justice would be blind; and it 
HeinOnline  -- 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1096 1973-1974
1096 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
The third main element in the so-called Americanization of the 
legal system exists with respect to the function of the lower courts. 
In the later Colonial period, lower "courts" performed many func-
tions for the "good order" ·of society. Their scope was pervasive, 
and largely untrammelled by any concerns with separation of 
powers.35 In this sense, they performed not only the political and 
economic, but also the social function of the English J.P.'s;36 in-
deed, the earliest law books in both Massachusetts and Virginia-
issued just before the Revolution-were magistrates' manuals. 
From an excellent study by Nelson,37 we now know that a change 
came over the Magistrates courts in Massachusetts between 1760 
and 1820 and, it is reasonable to think, in most of the other colonies. 
They ceased to be so concerned with morality and status and became 
more conscious of economic relationships and efficiency. 
This development is similarly characterized as Americanization 
with its implication that either no or different changes occurred in 
England. It is conceivable that a definitive study would show no 
largely parallel movement in England, since nineteenth century 
English legal history is even more neglected than American legal 
history during the period. But once again, considerable initial evi-
dence exists that many parallel developments took place in the 
lower courts in England. During a similar period, many of the 
regulatory functions of the magistrates were abandoned; the 1834 
would wear a poker face. The picture of the behavior of judges had 
enough truth, and enough hypnotic force, to influence the role-playing of 
judges; and to bring some peace and consensus to issues of i;_enure, 
selection behavior and removal of judges. 
L. Friedman, A History of American Law 116 (1973). 
35 In Connecticut, the elected grand jury worked with the County Court 
(magistrates or J.P.'s). They "were required to oversee workmen in clearing 
the commons, to present persons for selling drinks [and] ••• for not attending 
public worship ••• to inform against killing deer, to meet with selectmen and 
constables in nominating tavern keepers, to present servants for being out 
unreasonable hours, to see that Indian children learned to read, to present 
persons for setting up lotteries, to inspect taverns, and to pull down secular 
notifications posted on the Sabbath or a Day of Fast." The Superior Court 
Diary of William Samuel Johnson, 1772-1773, at xlii (J. Farrell ed. 1942). 
86 The system operated by the justices was based on the idea of uni-
versal obligations •••• If (a road) was found not to be in repair that 
was an offence, a nuisance, and the parish on whom the obligation to 
maintain it rested, should be presented before the magistrates for a fail-
ing in duty. The parish would then be ordered to set its inhabitants to 
work in unpaid road labour, or to pay in the form of a note, for hired 
men to do the job for him. Pigs straying in the churchyard, the failure 
of a poor law surveyor to find a willing successor, the collapse of a local 
town hall, all these might be grouped together as nuisances, that is 
things contrary to that paper order and peace which all had a duty to 
maintain. 
J. Watson, The Reign of George III 45-47 (1960). 
87 W. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law During the Revo-
lutionary Era: A Study of Legal Change in Massachusetts 1760-1830 (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1971). 
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Parliament gave Poor Law matters to special Guardians; the 
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 took many other administra-
tive matters away; after 1792 any borough might appoint a stipen-
diary magistrate; and in the 1820's the professionalization of the 
police began and control by the J.P.'s declined. There is evidence 
of the same movement away from defending social status toward 
protecting economic relationships that Nelson found in Middlesex 
County, Massachusetts.38 Meanwhile, the judicial functions of the 
Magistrates were rationalized.39 In this sense, the lowest courts 
in both England and America were rationalized or modernized or, 
if one accepts the chauvinistic approach of American academics, 
Americanized. Without necessarily criticizing what has gone before, 
it seems clear that the potential for more sophisticated comparative 
historical studies in the area is almost unlimited. 
Final Thoughts 
The examples offered-the distinction which has occurred be-
cause the study of anti-lawyer sentiment in the colonies in the 
seventeenth century has been largely divorced from the study of 
anti-lawyer sentiment in England, and the untested assumptions 
about the English model which underlie discussions of the Ameri-
canization of the courts and judiciary after independence--are but 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of potentially fruitful comparative 
historical studies. The nineteenth century, in particular, could pro-
vide several more. 
Indeed, in law, as in so many areas, the nineteenth century pro-
vides a fascinating galaxy of parallels and interactions between 
England and the United States. While nothing as dramatic as 
Jacksonian Democracy swept England, the Chartists, in their time, 
seemed to pose a similar threat to the established order. Utilitarian 
thought in general, manifested in such concepts as codification, 
was a powerful influence on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite all 
the talk of Americanization of the judiciary, by the end of the 
century the "formal style"40 had largely engulfed both English 
and American judges. And, in professional matters, the American 
Bar Association was looking enviously at the Inns of Court while, 
in terms of academic law, the Oxford professorate was looking 
enviously at the Harvard Law School. The symbiotic relationship 
was far from dead. 
as Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary 
Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 450 (1967). 
39 Abel-Smith & Stevens, supra note 33, at 29-32. 
40 On the grand style and the formal style see K. Llewellyn, Deciding Ap-
peals: The Common Law Tradition (1960). 
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Merely to state such apparent superficial relationships justifies 
the value of considering further comparative historical studies. 
It may, of course, emerge that the superficial is misleading, that 
the legal cultures were moving in antithetical, not parallel direc-
tions; the apparent intellectual relationships may thus, to put it 
mildly, be distorting. But such a discovery would itself be vital, 
and would more than justify more serious Anglo-American his-
torical studies. 
Some understanding of the parallel or diverging developments 
in the two legal systems (as well as interactions between them) is 
essential to any more extensive work in English and American law 
as a comparative study. Like all good comparative analysis, such 
studies will help to sharpen and define issues, and may raise as 
many questions as they seek to answer. Again, in the best tradi-
tions of comparative studies, the work may tell us as much about 
our own system as it does about the other system we are studying. 
Yet, the closeness and the historical ties involved in Anglo-American 
law make the work both more difficult and more important. The 
urge to be chauvinistic, ignoring the other system, or to be arro-
gant, assuming we know what the other system was like, are ever 
present. Thus, as legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic turn 
their attention increasingly to studying recent legal history, it 
becomes vitally necessary to push forward with comparing the 
two major common law systems in a historical framework. Such 
studies would be in the best traditions of Comparative Law. I am 
sure Harry Lawson will approve. 
